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NON-THIRD PARTY SAFE PLACE CASES
ALBERT J. GOLDBERG*
Basically the application of the safe-place statute to non-third party
claimants is the same as in third party cases.
The application of the safe place statute to persons other than em-
ployees is based upon the definition of frequenter as found in Section
101.01(5) of the Wisconsin Statute. That is broad enough to cover
anybody who is in or about a public building as defined by the statute
or a place of employment who is other than a trespasser.
I. SAFE-PLACE STATUTE V. COMMON LAW
The importance of the statute to non-third party claimants is in
opening up of heretofore non-liability fields of litigation. We are all
familiar with the "falling-down" cases which, on common law principles,
are usually sure losers. It is in such cases that it is important to dig
deep to try to find some application of the safe-place statute. Here is
where a searching interview together with detailed investigation to be-
gin with, to determine what elements would bring the place where the
accident happened under the safe-place statute, is very important. To
begin with, the mere fact that in your initial investigation you determine
that there might be plain common law negligence involved should not
rule out your search for a safe-place violation. The two are not mutually
exclusive and as our Supreme Court has pointed out, they are not even
separate causes of action where they both exist in a case. Both a com-
mon law violation and safe-place violation should be pleaded as one
cause of action. The latter is fundamentally an allegation of the viola-
tion of a standard of care which is set by statute and it becomes part
and parcel of the overall negligence to be proven against the defendant.
So we get back to the original proposition that where ordinary negli-
gence is present in a case, it is nevertheless important to look for a con-
current violation of the safe-place statute. Conversely, having found a
violation of the safe-place statute, one should also look for, allege, and
try to prove the common law negligence aspect if it is present. There
is no need to elect remedies.
II. PUBLIC BUILDINGS V. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT
The fine distinction to look for in these cases is whether there has
been a violation of that part of the safe-place statute dealing with place
of employment or that part dealing with a public building. The question
might immediately come to one's mind, what difference does it make,
just so there is a violation of the safe-place statute? The difference arises
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in the proving of a violation of the safe-place statute. The extent of
liability proveable as a violation of the public building aspect of the
statute is much more confining than that covered by violations of the
place of employment aspect. The distinction is best pointed up by con-
sideration of one of the classic cases in this field: Bersch V. Holton
Street State Bank.' That case involved a person who was injured while
using the entry of the Holton Street State Bank. The slippery condition
of the entry was caused by people tracking in water on their snowy
shoes. The action was brought on the basis of failure of the owner of
the public premises to make it as safe as reasonably could be expected
by failing to use a rubber mat. The Court held that the owner of a pub-
lic building was under no duty to use a mat and failure to use one was
not a structural defect; that since it is to be expected that water will
constantly be tracked in and out by people entering such a public place,
it would be asking too much to expect the owner to keep it absolutely
dry. Thus, under the public building part of the safe-place statute, it was
impossible to establish a case.
Let us examine the evolution of the problem launched in Bersch3
The problem of a snowy, slippery entry to a business place was involved
again in Sturm v Simpson's Garment Company.3 There the case was
decided in favor of the plaintiff and interestingly enough, on two
grounds: first, on the question of common-law negligence, and secondly,
on the basis of the "place of employment" aspect of the safe-place
statute. The court distinguished the Sturnv case from the Holton Street
State Bank5 case because it was shown that the store owner in SturmG
did have a rubber mat which he could have used and he neglected to do
so. But, moreover, it was held that even absent the fact that this owner
had a rubber mat, it became a jury question as to whether or not he
should not have provided one. The distinction, of course, is that for a
public building to be unsafe within the statute, there must be a structural
defect, and a slippery floor created by transitory conditions is not a
structural defect. But, when one considers the standard of safety for a
place of employment, the fact that the condition is non-structural is not
controlling. By statutory definition, to be safe, there must be such free-
dom from danger to the property or the place of employment as the
nature of the employment, place of employment or public building will
reasonably permit. On its face it would appear the same rule applies to
public buildings as to places of employment. Yet as stated above the
application to public buildings is strictly structural. So in the Sturm
7
1247 Wis. 261, 19 N.W. 2d 175 (1945).
2 Bersch v. Holton Street State Bank, 247 Wis. 261, 19 N.W. 2d 175 (1945).
3 271 Wis. 587, 74 N.W. 2d 137 (1956).
4 Strum v. Simpson's Garment Co., 271 Wis. 587, 74 N.W. 2d 137 (1956).
5 Supra note 2.6Supra note 4.
7Strum v. Simpson Garment Co., 271 Wis. 587, 74 N.W. 2d 137 (1956).
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case, the Supreme Court held that, because the slippery wet place was a
place of employment, a jury could find that the nature of that place of
employment could reasonably permit constant and effective means of
preventing it from getting slippery by placing down a mat. Thus the
distinction was clearly drawn. If plaintiff's only theory of liability for
slippery business premises is as a public building-no mat necessary;
as a place of employment a mat could be a necessity.
III. NEW HOPE IN SIDEWALK-FALL CASES
Furthermore, the Court in Sturm" pointed out that while the ac-
cumulation of snow and ice in a public building would not be a structural
defect to constitute a violation of the safe-place statute, a like natural
accumulation of snow and ice might be the basis for holding an em-
ployer or owner of a place of employment liable for violating the safe-
place statute in not providing a safe place of employment. Note how far
this takes us in ice and snow slipping cases. Going back to common law,
the mere natural accumulation of snow and ice in any place, including
a public building, is an act of God and is not actionable negligence. This
is also the result under the public building aspect of the safe place
statute. But when it comes to a "place of employment," it does not
matter whether it is an act of God or a natural accumulation; the duty
is set by the statute for an employer to provide a place of employment,
as reasonably safe as the nature of the employment will permit and it
now becomes the duty of the maintainer of the place of employment to
somehow neutralize this danger caused by a natural accumulation of
snow and ice. This is a very important development in cases of falls by
the non-employed public. Most lawyers in general practice can point to
some case early in his career where someone fell on a parking lot or on
a sidewalk adjacent to a place of business or on steps leading from a
place of business in which he told the client that these are acts of God
and there really is no recourse for the injured person. Then came the
series of cases wherein our Supreme Court opened up the door to make
these actionable by finding, sometimes quite tenuously, that these are
places of employment. For instance, in Werner v. Gimbel Bros.,9 the
sidewalk which led to a parking lot was held to be a place of employ-
ment for those employees of Gimbels who would have to use the parking
lot. When a customer fell on this sidewalk, it was held that she could
base her claim on the safe-place statute, this being a place of employ-
ment and the customer being a frequenter. Similarly, there is a recent
case in which a woman was walking away from a funeral parlor and
fell on its icy steps. Filipiak v. Plombon.10 Again it was held that this
was a place of employment and therefore there was an action based
thereupon. The final evolution has extended this to the sidewalk in front
8 Id.
9 8 Wis. 2d 491, 99 N.W. 2d 708 (1959).
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of the place of employment. In Schwenn v. Loraine Hotel Company,"'
the Court extended this principal almost to its limit. I say almost be-
cause it has not gone so far as to say that just because there is a sidewalk
in front of a place over which an employee walks, it therefore is a place
of employment and an employer has the duty to keep this as safe as the
nature of the premises would reasonably permit. There must be some
usurpation of the sidewalk by the employer as an adjunct of his busi-
ness and in Loraine Hotel,12 that nexus was supplied by the fact that the
employer had taken over this one section of the public sidewalk as a
regular cab loading and unloading area, practically to the exclusion of
the public. Here bellboys had to constantly move around and it was
easily observable that a dangerous icy condition could cause harm to a
bellboy in the regular course of his employment. This suggests that in
every case where there are some employees of the employer who carry
on some of the employer's activities, the public sidewalk will be con-
sidered a place of employment (for instance, the starter at a nightclub
who opens and closes cabs or calls cabs, or the package boy at a super-
market who will carry packages out to the front of the store to load cars).
That, of course, could raise question as to how far down the street would
this extend. What if the package boy has to carry it to a store four or
five premises away from the main store? These are some suggested
extensions of liability.
How far does one go on the sidewalk as a place of employment;
could the mere fact that there is a public sidewalk in front of a place
of business on which an employee might fall make it a place of employ-
ment? Section 102.03(1) (c) 1 states that every employee going to and
from his employment in the ordinary and usual way while on the prem-
ises of his employer or while in the immediate vicinity thereof, if the
injury results from an occurrence on the premises, shall be deemed to
be performing service growing out of and incidental to his employ-
ment. Doesn't the language "while in the immediate vicinity thereof,"
bring the public sidewalk in front of the place in as the place of employ-
ment of the workers therein? If so, anybody falling on that public side-
walk is falling on a place of employment which has not been rendered
reasonably safe.
IV. SIDEWALKS AS PLAcES OF EMPLOYMENT
But the sidewalk cases have not been confined to the slip and fall
cases. The question has arisen quite frequently where someone has been
injured due to temporary conditions, not structural in nature, either in
the road or in the sidewalk, where a contractor has been doing either
public or private work. Invoking the place of employment rules of the
10 15 Wis. 2d 484, 113 N.W. 2d 365 (1962).
11.14 Wis. 2d 601, 111 N.W. 2d 495 (1961).
22 Schwenn v. Loraine Hotel Co., 14 Wis. 2d 601, 111 N.W. 2d 495 (1961).
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safe-place statute can establish a claim which might not be actionable
under common law negligence. A dramatic case pointing up the prob-
lem is Thiel v. Bohr Construction Company.13 There a little boy was
burned when he passed near a flare placed on a sidewalk. It was held
that though this was a. public street, it was a place of employment for
the employees of the contractor, and therefore an unguarded flare con-
stituted a failure of the employer to provide employment as safe as the
nature of the premises would permit. Everybody knows that that em-
ployer could have put a glass shield around that flare.
Other cases have involved a situation in which the public was re-
quired to leave the traveled part of the sidewalk because of the pre-
empting of that sidewalk by a contractor and thus were required to
walk on roughened or unsafe road or parkway between the sidewalk
and the road. A person being injured because of the failure of the em-
ployer to properly prepare that area for walking could establish a cause
of action.
V. NON-PROFIT NON-PLACES-OF-E PLOYMENT
There is one area of frustration in applying these doctrines that ordi-
narily make a safe-place case so promising under place of employment
criteria, and that is where the person is injured on the premises of either
a governmental or an eleemosynary institution. Here the usual rules as
to place of employment do not pertain, and only failure in structural
defects are actionable as violations of the safe-place statute. The reason
is that in Section 101.01(1) the definition of a "place of employment"
has been limited to premises which are being used for profit making
enterprises; non-profit or charitable hospitals and governmental in-
stitutions have been excluded.
Yet, here is where a little searching might establish a claim upon
authority of Gupton v. Wauwatosa.'4 For instance, St. Joseph's Hospi-
tal has a contract with a private firm to have an electrician at all times
assigned to the hospital to be sure that their electrical system is work-
ing. Doesn't the whole hospital now become a place of employment for
a profit making enterprise? If so, any other such hospital, any other
non-profit or eleemosynary organization, or governmental organization
which would have such a situation prevailing, would become the owner
or maintainer of a place of employment and would have the duty of
seeing that its premises were as safe as the nature of the employment
would reasonably permit. The fact is that hospitals have successfully
barred actions by the plea that they are not places of employment. In-
vestigation might prove that many of them in some respect are a place
of employment for someone. Moreover, some hospitals permit their
doctors to operate as independent contractors on their premises. This is
1313 Wis. 2d 196, 108 N.W. 2d 573 (1961).
149 Wis. 2d 217, 101 N.W. 2d 104 (1960).
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often the case with the X-ray men or the anesthetists; and these X-ray
men or anesthetists might have assistants who are paid directly by them
and not by the hospital. In other words, they are employees of these
specialists. Does not this, therefore, make the hospital a place of em-
ployment because of these specific profit making enterprises?
VI. SCOPE OF SAFE-PLACE STATUTE
A. In Buildings.
One of the big problems posed in this whole field has been raised by
a couple of decisions which the Supreme Court has rendered which
seem to contradict each other in regard to which part of a public build-
ing the statute applies. Assume that an overall structure is a public
building by statutory definition. If a person is hurt in some remote part
of it, is he necessarily covered by the safe-place statute? Apparently
this is a yes and no question determined by the circumstances. Under
some circumstances the injury would have to happen in a part of a
building which is commonly used by the public or three or more ten-
ants. This would be the result in those cases where there is a failure of
maintenance, as distinguished from a structural defect. See Frion z.
Coren.'5 But then we run head on into the case of Hanlon v. St. Francis
Seminary.1 6 There the court seemed to rule out any liability for a struc-
tural defect or a failure of maintenance if the accident occurred in a
part of the structure not commonly used by the public or by three or
more tenants, or where the employer had not maintained jurisdiction
over the premises. The Supreme Court has apparently now laid this
question to rest in the case of Lealion v. Quatso,'7 and has re-established
definitely the distinction between structural defects and maintenance
defects. The court distinguished the Ianlon' case, on the ground that
it was not squarely in point to begin with because what was involved
there was a brick wall which, in its very character, could not be con-
sidered a public building, and therefore whatever was said in that case
about structural defects was obiter dicta. This of course leaves in dis-
pute the holdings in Grossenbach v. Devonshire Realty Co.,"0 Flynn v.
Chippewa County,20 and Delaney v. Supreme Investment Co. 21 In a
final analysis, the Lealiou22 case distinguishes these other cases by prac-
tically overruling the Flynn2 case, limiting.the language of Delaney24
and by redefining the holding in Grossenbach25 to the effect that now,
15 13 Wis. 2d 300, 108 N.W. 2d 563 (1961).
16 264 Wis. 603, 60 N.W. 2d 381 (1953).
3. 15 Wis. 2d 128, 112 N.W. 2d 193 (1961).
I's Hanlon v. St. Francis Seminary, 264 Wis. 603, 60 N.W. 2d 381 (1953).
29 218 Wis. 633, 261 N.W. 742 (1935).
20 244 Wis. 455, 12 N.W. 2d 683 (1944).
21251 Wis. 374, 29 N.W. 2d 754 (1947).
22 Lealiou v. Quatso, 15 Wis. 2d 128, 112 N.W. 2d 193 (1961).2 3 Flynn v. Chippewa County, 244 Wis. 455, 12 N.W. 2d 683 (1944).
24 Delaney v. Supreme Investment Co., 251 Wis. 374, 29 N.W. 2d 754 (1947).
25 Grossenbach v. Devonshire Realty Co., 218 Wis. 633, 261 N.W. 742 (1935).
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examination will not be made as to whether or not the part of the build-
ing where the injury occurred comes within the definition of a public
building (i.e., used by the public or three or more tenants), but whether
there was any duty owed to the person who was injured in that part
of the building. In other words, if it was used by only two tenants and
yet the person injured had a right to be there, there still would be a
duty. To sum up, one should first determine whether the building as a
whole or any part of it qualifies as a public building. If it does, the
whole building will so qualify. The second determination is whether
the party who is injured in some out of the way part is there for an
authorized purpose, or whether he is a trespasser in that part of the
building.
B. Around Buildings.
The application of the statute to the peripheral parts of a public
building has also been extended, but by recent legislative action rather
than by court interpretation. In 1957, Section 101.01 (12) was amended
to make a porch, steps or an approach to a building a part of the struc-
ture of that building. Prior to that our Court had held in Moore v. City
of Milwaukee,26 that a woman who was hurt when she stepped out of a
temporary voting building which had an unattached step that led into
the structure, and this step tilted or teetered causing her to fall, that this
was not an integral part of the structure. It was held to be just an
approach to a public building, but not actually the public building. This
motivated the aforementioned amendment. As one can see this can have
a practical effect in bringing into play steps or entry structures which
othterwise might have been considered too remote.
VIII. PICKING DEFENDANTS
Finally, there is the problem of deciding who to bring the action
against. Broadly speaking, the answer is to include anybody and every-
body who is the owner, maintainer or controller of a public building
or place of employment. This raises the problem of co-extensive re-
sponsibility. The duty to provide a safe place of employment or to main-
tain a safe public building is a non-delegable duty. There can be multiple
owners or maintainers of a place of employment or a public building
and each one individually and separately has a duty to provide a safe
place of employment or a safe public building. Singleton v. Kubiak &
Schmitt, Inc." This is a hard concept for even judges to understand.
In practical application this can be very important, especially when
faced with an uninsured or non-responsible defendant. A typical case
could be an injury on the premises of an individual home owner who has
no public liability insurance. If it could be shown that someone else was
26267 Wis. 166, 65 N.W. 2d 3 (1954).
27 9 Wis. 2d 472, 101 N.W. 2d 619 (1960).
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engaged on the premises as an employer at the time the injury was suf-
fered, he could sue that party.
An interesting problem arose in a train crossing case against a rail-
road. Generally, these are very difficult cases to win under the common-
law. Yet in the case of Bembinster v. Aero Auto Parts,28 the railroad
crossing was held to be a place of employment because the railroad was
located on private property. There was an access road that crossed the
railroad which was unguarded and thus it became the duty of all main-
taining or controlling that crossing to provide a place of employment
which was as safe as the nature of the premises would reasonably per-
mit. Thus, a much stricter standard was applied to that crossing than
would be at common law, and the railroad had liability which it might
not have had under common-law.
Therefore, it is incumbent on the plaintiff's attorney to make a
thorough examination of the facts of his case, because often times the
statute allows recovery where a common law action would be unsuc-
cessful.
28 7 Wis. 2d 54, 95 N.W. 2d 778 (1959).
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